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  The financial crisis that struck most of the world’s advanced industrialized economies 
during 2007-9 has presented a major challenge for economists concerned with economic 
fluctuations, and especially for those interested in the workings of monetary policy.  By many 
measures the crisis constituted the most significant macroeconomic event since World War II.  
Further, the origin of these events (as the label suggests) was squarely in the financial sector, and 
the policy actions that governments in many countries took in response, first during the crisis and 
then in the post-crisis recovery effort, importantly involved monetary policy.  Yet the models of 
monetary policy now commonly in use, both for teaching students in the field and for supporting 
policymaking within central banks, are not only incapable of incorporating the most widely 
accepted accounts of how this episode occurred but incapable too of analyzing the actions that 
monetary policymakers took.  The gap between the models and the world of monetary 
policymaking is now wider than at any time since the 1930s. 
                                                              
* This paper is based on my paper “The simple Analytics of Monetary Policy: A post-Crisis 
Approach,” Journal of Economic Education, ________.  
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  The analytical models that have become standard within macroeconomics over the last 
generation are not only incapable of explaining what happened during this unusually significant 
episode, but unsuited even to incorporating most of the now widely accepted accounts of it.  
Today’s standard macro-models typically include no financial-sector variables other than a short-
term interest rate and (perhaps) the quantity of “money,” and no way for what happens in the 
financial arena to affect nonfinancial economic activity other than via “the” interest rate’s role in 
inter-temporal consumer choice (and perhaps an influence of real money balances, also on 
consumption).  The larger empirical models used by many central banks have more expanded 
detail, including treatments of investment, and they make explicit a variety of real and nominal 
rigidities; but still the basic mechanism is the same.  Neither offer any way to understand why 
the failure of a firm like Lehman Brothers, in September 2008, would have had a meaningful 
effect on the economy, or why it mattered that governments in the United States and elsewhere 
acted vigorously to prevent other firms from failing.  Nor do these models offer any explanation 
of why or how the unusual actions that central banks took – establishing special lending facilities 
for banks, purchasing targeted securities like commercial paper and residential mortgages, 
providing forward guidance on the policy interest rate – would have had any effect.  According 
to the models, once the central bank’s policy interest rate reached the practical lower bound of 
zero, monetary policy simply had no further role to play. 
  To their credit, macroeconomists and others have reacted to the crisis with a profusion of 
new research efforts exploring the workings of financial intermediation and asset holding, and 
investigating in particular the implications of a variety of “frictions” that intermediation 
inherently entails under conditions that obtain in any even moderately advanced economy.  But 
there is no point of contact between most of this work and the standard workhorse models.  3 
 
Anyone seeking to understand how one or another strand of this new research fits into the 
canonical macroeconomic framework therefore sees an unbridged chasm between two seemingly 
incompatible lines of thinking about what is clearly the same set of behavioral phenomena.  And, 
in contrast to earlier eras in the development of macroeconomics, researchers seeking to establish 
the motivation for their work, among more than a narrow audience of fellow specialists, are able 
to appeal to what everyone has read in the newspapers but not to what the field holds out as the 
accepted conceptual overview.   
  The most obvious example of this divide is the behavior of central bank balance sheets, 
both during and in the aftermath of the crisis.  Most of the advanced economies’ central banks 
responded to the crisis by rapidly expanding their balance sheets, purchasing assets in the open 
market and correspondingly issuing liabilities.  The Bank of England has increased its balance 
sheet five-fold since the beginning of 2007, the U.S. Federal Reserve System four-fold, and the 
European Central Bank and Sweden’s Riksbank more than three-fold (although the Riksbank’s 
assets are now back to only double what they were at the beginning of 2007), and  the Bank of 
Canada two-fold.    
  Moreover, this radical departure in central bank asset holding was not just a matter of 
total quantity; the character of the assets these central banks held changed as well.  Traditionally, 
most of the assets that central banks hold have been obligations of their own governments, and 
within those, mostly short-term obligations.  But during and in the wake of the crisis most of the 
major central banks massively substituted loans to specific financial institutions and then 
privately-issued securities for their customary holdings.  By mid 2010, residential mortgages 
represented nearly half of the Federal Reserve’s entire portfolio; today, with the total balance 
sheet now at $3.5 trillion, mortgages still constituted 35 percent of total assets. 4 
 
  Why did these central banks undertake such massive expansions of their asset holdings?  
And what reason did they have for doing so primarily via loans to banks and then purchases of 
assets like commercial paper and mortgages?  Why should an informed economist have expected 
these actions to affect either the financial markets or, more importantly, nonfinancial activity?  
By what metric would one judge whether these actions were effective?  Students educated to 
view the macroeconomy and the role of monetary policy through the standard models have no 
way even to begin to pursue any of these very natural questions.  And the researchers who have 
pursued them have little way to connect their work to the conceptual frameworks that the 
standard models offer. 
  Analogous questions arise from looking at these central banks’ liabilities.  Central banks’ 
balance sheets, like those of other entities, balance.  The huge increase in asset holdings with 
which they responded to the crisis therefore meant an equally huge increase in their outstanding 
liabilities.  Students taught to view the macroeconomy through the lens of central bank (or “high 
powered”) money supply would presumably have expected not just an increase of a few 
percentage points in these economies’ rates of inflation but a hyperinflation, perhaps even 
reminiscent of what occurred in Germany and Russia after World War I or in Hungary after 
World War II.  Indeed, more than a few economists predicted just such a consequence of these 
extraordinary central bank actions.   
  But no such increase in inflation – not even a few percentage points – has yet appeared, 
in any of these economies.  To be sure, no one can preclude with certainty even that a 
hyperinflation, or something like it, may ensue some time somewhere.  But even if inflation in 
these countries does pick up pace at some point, a response of some percentage points to this 
magnitude of increase in central bank liabilities, and only after a delay of more than half a 5 
 
decade, is widely at variance with the core implications of standard models relating prices to 
central bank money.  Given the huge magnitude of the expansion in central bank balance sheets, 
and in light of the weight that least-squares statistical methods attach to outlier observations, for 
at least the next generation no one will again be able to get economically sensible estimates, for 
any of the large high-income economies, from what were once standard regressions relating the 
price level (or its rate of change) to the quantity (or change) of central bank liabilities. 
 
A Conceptual Framework 
 
  The most familiar workhorse of monetary-policy macroeconomics today is the three-
equation “new Keynesian” model consisting of an aggregate demand equation representing 
consumers’ forward-looking inter-temporal choice for a given interest rate, a “Phillips curve” 
representing the forward-looking behavior of price setters operating under some form of 
impediment to perfect price flexibility, and an equation representing the central bank’s setting of 
a short-term nominal interest rate in response to observed movements of prices or output or both.  
The problem with this model, for current purposes, is not so much that it is wrong but that it is 
incomplete.  Once the central bank’s policy interest rate has reached the zero lower bound, the 
model implicitly portrays monetary policy as impotent to undertake any further economic 
stimulus.  It leaves no room even to consider the kinds of additional measures that many central 
banks undertook during and in the aftermath of the 2007-9 crisis. 
  The remedy, therefore, is not to discard this otherwise useful framework but to expand it 
– while nonetheless preserving, in so far as possible, its analytical advantages in terms of 
parsimony and compactness.  The model’s crucial lacuna, for purposes of representing the 
actions of central banks during this recent period and their effect on the nonfinancial economy, is 
the absence of any distinction between the interest rate that the central bank sets – in 6 
 
conventional vocabulary, the “policy interest rate” – and the interest rates at which households 
and firms regularly borrow and lend, and that therefore matter for their spending decisions, either 
as direct costs (if they are borrowers/investors) or as opportunity costs (if they are 
lenders/savers).  The simple framework suggested here fills that gap by adding a two-equation 
supply-demand apparatus explicitly representing lenders’ and borrowers’ behavior in the market 
for private-sector obligations. 
  Two elements of the standard “new Keynesian” model suffice with no change:  Price 
setters set today’s prices in response to aggregate output of goods and services and to their 
expectations of future prices.  And the central bank sets the policy interest rate in response to the  
difference between actual output and its target level of output (presumably the level that would 
deliver stable inflation) and to the difference between actual inflation and its target rate of 
inflation.   
  The third element of the standard model is necessary as well, although with an important 
change.  Aggregate demand for goods and services depends on expected future output, as in the 
standard model, but also on the expected real interest rate derived from the nominal interest rate 
relevant to private-sector spending decisions.  The important distinction is that the nominal 
interest rate that matters for these decisions is not the policy interest rate that the central bank 
sets but instead some private-sector rate that households and firms would pay on borrowing to 
finance spending in excess of current income, or that they would earn on unspent income or 
other accumulated assets.   
  Distinguishing between these two interest rates means abandoning the assumption, which 
has been commonplace in standard macroeconomic theory ever since the inception of the field, 
that all non-money assets are perfect substitutes.  Most central banks normally conduct monetary 7 
 
policy by setting an overnight interest rate, or if not overnight then for some other very short 
maturity: in the United States the federal funds rate (usually overnight transactions), in Europe 
the “EONIA” Euro overnight interest average, and in Japan the uncollateralized call loan rate 
(also mostly one-day loans).  By contrast, the obligations that either households or firms issue to 
finance their spending, and likewise the instruments in which households invest their savings, are 
typically of much longer maturity, often measured in years rather than days.  Further, while the 
interest rates that central banks set for purposes of monetary policy are mostly for obligations 
that are implicitly guaranteed – often claims on banks’ holdings of reserves at the central bank 
itself – private-sector obligations are potentially subject to default.  On grounds of both maturity 
and default risk, therefore, the obligations respectively underlying the policy interest rate and the 
constellation of private-sector rates are not perfect substitutes when investors are risk averse.  
Moreover, the difference, or spread, between the two interest rates can vary over time even if 
investors’ risk aversion is constant. 
  It therefore remains to determine the private interest rate, given the policy interest rate set 
by the central bank.  Two further relationships, representing supply and demand in the market for 
private securities, suffice for this purpose:  Households and firms borrow in relation to how 
much they expect to spend (borrowing more when they expect to spend more) and, importantly, 
to how much it costs them (borrowing less when the expected real interest rate– the nominal 
interest rate on the securities they issue minus the inflation they expect over the securities’ life – 
is higher).  Correspondingly, private investors, who likewise include households and firms 
within the economy but perhaps also financial intermediaries as well as foreign investors, lend to 
households and firms in relation to their expectations of the borrowers’ future income levels 
(lending more as they expect borrowers to earn more and therefore be more creditworthy) and, 8 
 
importantly, to the difference between the return they expect on private securities compared to 
returns on alternative investments (buying more private securities when that difference is 
greater).  Further, for at least some private investors – for example, banks – a plausible 
alternative investment is in assets that yield the policy interest rate.  Hence the policy interest 
rate that the central bank is setting today matters, but so does the policy interest rate that 
investors expect the central bank to set over the remaining life of the private securities. 
  The volume of private securities issued by households and firms must equal the volume 
of these securities bought.  In the absence of purchases by the central bank, this would mean the 
volume bought by private-sector investors.  But when the central bank also buys privately issued 
securities – as many central banks have done in response to the recent crisis – then market 
clearing instead requires that the volume of these securities issued by private borrowers equal the 
volume bought by private investors plus the volume bought by the central bank.   
 
Two Examples from Recent Central Bank Policy Actions 
    
  Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the workings of this expanded model’s portrayal of an adverse 
shock to financial intermediation, as occurred during the recent crisis, followed by policy actions 
of the kind taken by many central banks.  The downward-sloping line labeled IS in the right-
hand panel of each figure shows the relationship between spending on goods and services and 
the private-sector interest rate, conditional on given expectations of future output and inflation.  
The downward-sloping line in the left-hand panel of each figure, labeled c
S, depicts households’ 
and firms’ supply of private securities, as a function of the interest rate on these securities, also 
for given expectations of future output and inflation.  The solid upward-sloping line in the left-
hand panel, labeled c
D + c
CB, correspondingly depicts private investors’ demand for these 
securities, as a function of the interest rate they bear, for given expectations of future incomes, a 9 
 
given value of the policy interest rate set by the central bank today and given expectations of the 
policy interest rate in the future, plus a given level of purchases of these securities by the central 
bank.  Both Figure 1 and Figure 2 arbitrarily portray the initial supply-demand equilibrium in the 
asset market in the left-hand panel, labeled point A, at the private-sector interest rate level that, 
when transposed to the right-hand panel, intersects with the IS line at the full-employment value, 
labeled y*. 
  The story told in each figure begins from the kind of adverse shock that figured 
prominently in triggering the recent financial crisis: a decline in house prices, or realized loan 
losses that deplete lenders’ capital, or even simply investors’ concern that the economy may be 
heading into a slow period in which private-sector borrowers’ creditworthiness will be under 
stress.  Any or all of these events reduces private investors’ demand for private-sector securities 
and therefore, all else equal, shifts the demand curve backward to the respective broken lines in 
the left-hand panels of Figures 1 and 2.  The result in each case is a higher market-clearing 
private-sector interest rate, and therefore a reduced value of income, at the respective points 
labeled B.  Under normal circumstances, when movements of the policy interest rate are not 
limited by the zero lower bound, the central bank presumably would choose to reduce its policy 
interest rate.  Doing so would shift the demand for private-sector securities so as to reduce the 
private interest rate as well, and thereby restore output to its original level.  For purposes of 
thinking about the 2007-9 crisis, however, the policy interest rate had reached the zero lower 
bound and so further cuts were not an available option.     
  Many central banks therefore turned to large-scale purchases of private-sector securities.  
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of such purchases following an adverse shock (again, from an 
erosion of borrowers’ creditworthiness, or a depletion of lenders’ capital) to the demand for 10 
 
private securities.  Here the central bank’s purchases are a straightforward addition to the total 
market demand for these securities, and so they shift the demand curve outward to the dotted line 
in the left-hand panel, thereby lowering the market-clearing private interest rate for given 
expectations and a given (presumably zero) policy interest rate.  The corresponding result in the 
right-hand panel is an increase in output.  Both intersections are labeled as point C.   Figure 1 
illustrates the presumably realistic case in which the central bank’s purchases, however, are not 
sufficient to restore output to the initial full-employment level. 
  A second policy tool to which some central banks turned in the crisis, in the absence of 
the ability to cut the policy interest rate any further, was forward guidance.  The Federal 
Reserve’s Open Market Committee reduced its target for the federal funds rate to 0 – ¼ percent 
in December 2008.  At the same time, it publicly stated that “the Committee anticipates that 
weak economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate 
for some time.”  Apart from a change in wording from “some time” to “an extended period,” the 
Committee repeated the same public statement after each meeting that it held through June 2011.  
In August 2011, it then switched to a more explicit statement that “the Committee currently 
anticipates that economic conditions … are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the 
federal funds rate at least through mid-2013.”  Thereafter, the Committee extended the specific 
horizon for this forward guidance several times, by late 2012 indicating the anticipation of low 
short-term interest rates “at least through mid-2015.”  And in December 2012 the Committee 
shifted to a new form of statement explicitly conditioned on observed and forecast economic 
outcomes: “the Committee … currently anticipates that this exceptionally low level for the 
federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6 
½ percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half 11 
 
percentage point above the Committee’s 2-percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation 
expectations continue to be well anchored.” 
  Figure 2 illustrates the working of this kind of forward guidance on the future policy 
interest rate.  Reducing the policy rate that investors expect in the future shifts the demand curve 
for private-sector securities downward, again lowering the market-clearing private interest rate, 
as indicated by the dotted line in the left-hand panel of the figure, and correspondingly raising 
output in the right-hand panel, in each case to the point labeled C.  (With the linear demand 
curve drawn here, the downward movement due to a lower expected future policy rate in Figure 
2 is visually indistinguishable from the outward movement due to greater central bank purchases 
in Figure 1; but the movement in the demand curve due to forward guidance is vertical, not 
horizontal.)  Here too the figure illustrates the case in which the effect of the central bank’s 
forward guidance is not sufficient to restore income to the initial level – presumably because of 
the zero lower bound on the policy interest rate.   
 
In Conclusion 
  The practice of monetary policy, as carried out by the central banks of the advanced 
industrialized economies, has changed since the 2007-9 financial crisis.  The analysis of 
monetary policy needs to change as well.  Monetary policy is no longer merely a matter of the 
central bank’s setting some short-term nominal interest rate.  Once they had cut their policy 
interest rates to the effective lower bound, during and in the aftermath of the crisis, many central 
banks pursued further measures like targeted asset purchases and forward guidance on the policy 
rate itself, in both cases intended to reduce longer-term interest rates for private-sector borrowers 
and thereby stimulate nonfinancial economic activity.  The analysis of monetary policy needs to 12 
 
be able to accommodate these monetary policy actions too.  It is no longer sufficient to represent 
the central bank as having a single policy tool at its disposal. 
  The point is a fundamental one, in two ways.  First, for decades the common theoretical 
understanding has been that monetary policy has only one independent instrument at its disposal: 
it can set the quantity of its outstanding liabilities, or it can set their market price – that is, the 
interest rate at which they are exchanged – but it cannot independently set both.  In modern 
times, with brief exceptions, most central banks have chosen to carry out monetary policy by 
setting the interest rate corresponding to banks’ holdings of reserves held at the central bank.  In 
their response to the 2007-9 crisis, most of the major central banks initially used the interest-rate 
instrument and then, once the policy interest rate had reached the lower bound, turned to the 
quantity instrument.  Viewed from this perspective, in each phase of the response to the crisis the 
central bank was, as in the traditional understanding, still using only one monetary policy 
instrument at a time. 
  But the ongoing discussion of monetary policy in the post-crisis recovery has made clear 
that, under arrangements now in place in most of the high-income economies – specifically, with 
the central bank able to pay interest on banks’ reserve balances – monetary policymakers need 
not deploy only one of these instruments at a time.  The central bank’s ability to choose what 
quantity of assets to purchase (with consequent increase in its liabilities), as many central banks 
did during and following the crisis, is not merely an artifact of the policy interest rate’s being at 
the lower bound.   Paying interest on reserves effectively established a floor to short-term market 
interest rates.  Importantly, it does so without the central bank’s needing to carry out 
conventional open market operations; indeed, it can even do so while the central bank is 
changing the quantity of its assets and liabilities in the opposite direction to what would 13 
 
correspond, under the traditional theory, to whatever change in the policy interest rate it is 
implementing at the same time.  Given today’s institutions, therefore, the central bank can 
choose both the quantity of its outstanding liabilities and their market price (that is, the interest 
rate at which they trade).   Monetary policy has not one independent instrument but two. 
  The second way in which the monetary policy response to the 2007-9 crisis has 
represented a fundamental departure is that the movement of central banks’ liabilities has been, 
in most cases, merely the passive (and, for macroeconomic purposes, mostly irrelevant) 
counterpart of the changes central banks have made in their asset holdings.  Policymakers’ 
decisions, and whatever economic effects have ensued, have been a matter of the asset side of 
central banks’ balance sheets, not their liabilities.   
  Numerous researchers have been actively engaged in seeking to understand, and where 
possible to quantify, the working of monetary policy within this new and very different 
theoretical framework.  The necessarily simplified conceptual framework that macroeconomists 
teach to students of the subject – and to which they turn in their own short-hand intuitive 
thinking – should incorporate this changed monetary policy landscape as well.  The simple 
framework set forth here provides a way of doing so. 
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Figure 1:  Effect of a Central Bank Asset Purchase  
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Figure 2:  Effect of Forward Guidance on the Policy Interest Rate  
 
 
 
 
 
 